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Halford Mackinder has had a posthumous existence that many
of us might envy. Long after his earthly demise, some of his ideas,
particularly that of the “geographical pivot of history,” keep coming
back to life. Currently, some well-known pundits in US foreign-
policy circles, typically thought of as neo-conservative and keen
on a “muscular” US military presence around the world, have
re-discovered Mackinder’s geographical determinism as providing
a seemingly naturalistic account for the approaching rebirth of
the “yellow peril” (the rise of China) and offering as it did at the
turn of the last century a timeless rendering of the challenges
to the democratic maritime powers from the despotic land powers
of Eurasia. The widely cited American journalist Robert Kaplan
(2010: 22), for example, frames the emerging “geography” of
China’s power almost entirely in these terms. It is timely, therefore,
to have a new intellectual biography of Mackinder that not only
critically engages with the central themes of his geopolitics but
that does so by both situating them in the historical context of
the early twentieth century and showing why they remain attrac-
tive in some quarters by dint of their effective depoliticization of
the very world politics that they underwrite. This book matters,
therefore, in a number of distinctive ways. That was why a session
devoted to it was so worth organizing at the Washington DC AAG
Annual Meeting in April 2010.
When I first heard from Gerry Kearns that he was planning to
write a book focused onMackinder and his geopolitics I must admit
to having been less than enthusiastic. I have spent some time and
energy down the years trying to expropriate the word “geopolitics”* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lxd17@psu.edu (L. Dowler).
doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.09.007twentieth century imperialists. But I erred. Gerry has done much
more than write a conventional biography of Mackinder. A very
serviceable one by Brian Blouet (1987) already exists. The various
commentaries that follow this Introduction outline what the
book does across the course of its nine chapters. More critically
they also show how the book contributes to our understanding of
both why it was Mackinder’s ideas and not those of some contem-
poraries that tended to win out and why these ideas have had
a continuing resonance, particularly in policy-making circles in
certain foreign ministries, years after the immediate historical
context in which Mackinder lived has long disappeared. What is
important to emphasize above all as its leitmotif is that this book
is illustrative of a successful use of the biography of a singularly
influential geopolitical thinker to show howalternative geopolitical
scenarios and futures have always been and still are possible.
Mackinder never used the word geopolitics. Yet, at least in the
English-speaking world, it is to him and a couple of other writers
from around his lifetime (Mahan, for example) that the term is
frequently ascribed. In lodging the geo into politics as a causal
term, the compound word conveys exactly the combined sense
of geographical determinism and prophetic understanding to
which the geopolitician aspires. He (it is almost always so) tells
us what is determining and, presumably, in having this expert
knowledge, can warn us (those of us on the wrong side of the
geography) before it is too late. The contradiction here, of course,
is that if we can aspire to do something in the face of geographical
determinism then the determinism cannot be absolute but must
be also contingent in its effects. Obviously, noting such irony
was not Mackinder’s strong point, neither is it of his apostles.
Gerry Kearns fills us in on how this happened and, more impor-
tantly perhaps, on how it can be exploited to create a very
different approach to geopolitics in which it is the very contin-
gencies of political economy and geopolitical imagination that
become its determining elements.
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Matthew G. Hannah
Gerry Kearns’ book is a model of critical scholarship. As critique,
it does political geographers and international relations scholars the
considerable service of placing those iconic ideas of Mackinder at
least schematically familiar to most of us (the geographical pivot
of history, heartland and rimland, etc.) within the geopolitical, intel-
lectual and more broadly cultural contexts of Mackinder’s day. We
see just howdeeplyMackinder’s assumptions about the geopolitical
world were shaped by his commitment to the project of British
Empire. We see how tightly this geopolitical vision was woven
with a rather crude racism as well as with a concern for ‘masculine’
behavioral ideals. Perhaps most importantly, we see that the entire
web of positions, priorities and practices out of which Mackinder
constructed his influential views was never the only game in
town. Through searching discussions of the ideas and activities
of Peter Kropótkin, Mary Kingsley, John Hobson, Élisée Reclus, and
others, Kearns makes a strong case that there were very different
and much more progressive ways to understand the world, its
peoples and its politics, even on the basis of many of the starting
assumptions upon which Mackinder likewise relied. This elaboration
of contemporaneous alternatives is perhaps the most elegant
feature of the entire argument.
The implication, of course, is that Mackinder’s ideas, however
influential, have always been optional. This is brought home very
nicely through the main chapters of the book by pairing up each
major facet of Mackinder’s thinking (social Darwinism, a heavy
investment in masculinist behavioral ideals, commitment to
Empire, educational program) with parallel but decidedly different
approaches to these themes by a series of his contemporaries. In
what for me is the strongest chapter of the book, the penultimate
chapter entitled “Conservative Geopolitics”, Kearns shows in great
detail how many strands of Mackinder’s basic approach have been
revived or recycled in the late 20th and early 21st centuries and
sold to US, British and other publics as natural or inevitable.
The final chapter, then, “Progressive Geopolitics”, draws together
and updates some of the main insights of Mackinder’s original
opponents to survey the current geopolitical scene from a very
different perspective. Here, too, Kearns is very persuasive.
I want to dwell on two related issues, the construction of histor-
ical discourses in Geopolitics and Empire, and the importance of
cultures of masculinity to the history of geopolitics. In my reading,
the discourses contemporaneous with Mackinder come across in
the book as only partly anchored in institutional fields of power.
In Chapter 2 especially, but throughout the book, Kearns embeds
Mackinder himself very thoroughly in relation to the various levers
of power and influence. To some extent it is inevitable that Kropót-
kin, Kingsley, Hobson and Reclus are not so thoroughly contextual-
ized, as the book is not primarily about them. Nevertheless, there is
a noticeable contrast between how thoroughly Kearns relates these
figures to discursive networks and how little material there is about
their political influence. Chapter 3 illustrates this pattern very well.
There Mackinder’s evolutionist view of the political world is care-
fully contrasted with that of Kropótkin. Kearns brings to light
strong evidence that the discursive formation they both inhabited
was in fact rivenwith real disagreements, that Kropótkin’s writings
found a broad readership, and that his position had a significant
number of adherents. But when it comes to Kropótkin’s influence
upon the formation of policy in elite circles, or upon government
decision-making, no information is provided. Here as elsewhere,
the historical narrative does make clear that Mackinder’s geopolit-
ical ideas themselves were not predestined to be implemented, but
this is a long way from showing that the progressive alternativesstood even a ghost of a chance. There is precious little in the narra-
tive to steer the reader away from the tenacious impression that
Reclus, Kropótkin and company would have failed rather miserably
on measures of “impact,” had there been some precursor to the
“Research Excellence Framework” through which open-minded
and creative scholarship is now so effectively promoted in the
UK. The only remotely likely alternative to Mackinder’s conserva-
tive imperialism appears to have been the increasingly influential
liberal imperialism adopted by, for example, Lloyd George. It was
possible, as Kearns shows so elegantly, to think quite progressively
at the time, but how possible was it to think progressively and influ-
ence geopolitical practice?
There are of course many different ways to approach this
question. Here I would like to emphasize masculinist gender norms
(bearing in mind of course their intersectional embeddedness).
Geopolitical discourse since 9/11 has demonstrated once again
the importance of what might be called “trump appeals,” themes
or figures put forward in times of perceived crisis as so basic that
they override “normal” considerations. As some of the literature
cited by Kearns in his Chapter 4 makes clear, the purported need
to act (or perhaps more importantly, to appear to act) in a “manly”
or “masculine” way is a recurrent trump appeal, one which is
crucially important in discourses about whether to pursue the use
of force or the maintenance of control as opposed to diplomacy,
negotiation, or disengagement from a relation of domination. An
impressive and troubling illustration of how manly behavioral
norms have functioned as a trump appeal in geopolitics is Robert
Dean’s study of debates in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration
about whether to pull out of or stay in Vietnam (Dean, 2001).
My suggestion here is that a masculinist discourse pervasive in
one guise or another in many European and North American coun-
tries in Mackinder’s time would have been a serious barrier to the
implementation of any truly progressive geopolitics.
Kearns’ focus upon a specific set ofmasculine behavioral norms to
explain aspects ofMackinder’s geopolitics aswell as his insistence on
climbingMt. Kenya is very important. But therewere othermasculine
behavioral norms circulating inMackinder’s time in addition to those
highlighted byKearns. Amore extended engagementwith geograph-
ical writings on masculinism, exploration, science and the mastery
of territory, particularly the work of Karen Morin on AGS President
Charles P. Daly (Morin, 2008), or my own book about the explicitly
masculinist governmental vision of Francis A. Walker (Hannah,
2000), would have helped to further differentiate the field of mascu-
linist options within which Mackinder’s specific location can be
understood. With the late-nineteenth-century modernization of
techniques of extended territorial governance in the British Empire,
the United States and elsewhere, a new suite of masculine roles
was in the process of being consolidated, variants of the rational,
all-surveying administrator of space. This figure complicated any
simple mapping of masculinity or its lack onto a distinction between
“the field” and “the comforts of civilization.” The omniscient admin-
istrator was not ensconced in a cushy, smoke-wreathed gentlemen’s
club but busily marshalling previously unheard of epistemic
resources in the head offices of the scientific or governmental knowl-
edge gathering institutions that were transforming London, Wash-
ington DC or Paris into vast centers of calculation. Many of the men
who adopted some variant of this subject position did so through
a revolving door linking government to the halls of academia, so it
would have been at least a thinkable path for Mackinder.
Mackinder shared much with other “men of science,” particularly
in his belief that the demands of modern life in a powerful country
posed new challenges to national education systems. As Kearns
shows in Chapter 6, Mackinder was keenly interested in tailoring
the British educational system to the cultivation of citizens simulta-
neously appreciative of their democratic responsibilities at home
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inder’s career path diverged from those of scientist–administrators,
though, in his assumption of a specifically legislative, as opposed
to administrative, position in government, and in his short-lived
mission to the contested fringes of imperial territory. Both of these
experiences were quite obviously shaped by the contending forces
of politics, and would have made it more difficult for Mackinder to
style himself a cool, rational man of science surveying the scene
from the Olympian heights of detached objectivity. He did link into
the project of scientific inventory on his Mt. Kenya expedition. But
asMatthew Edney shows in his study of themapping of British India,
the subject positions associatedwith objective field observationwere
different from those associatedwith objective compilation and inter-
pretation of knowledge in the metropole (Edney, 1997).
All of this is a roundabout way of saying that Geopolitics and
Empire tends to limit what counted as masculine performance to
the nexus of exploration and violent contest with nature and natives
linked in Mackinder’s thought and practice to conservative imperi-
alism, whereas there were equally prestigious masculine roles
available to the rising territorial administrators of liberal empire.
Both masculine types, however, remained invested in control and
mastery of one sort or another, and I would suggest that, in Mack-
inder’s time at least, to reject these overarching goals was to locate
one’s geopolitical vision outside the realm of the potentially influen-
tial. This, I believe, helps explainwhy the visions of Kropótkin, Kings-
ley or Reclus were never very likely to animate British or other great
power geopolitics at the time.
The latter part of Kearns’ book, which brings geopolitical ques-
tions into the present, culminates in a powerful exhortation to refuse
the naturalization of neoliberal empire or conservative geopolitics as
the only possible systemic arrangements for the 21st century.
Here he is able to make a stronger link between progressive ideas
and impact than in his account of Mackinder’s context. He does
not neglect to include a feminist critique ofmasculinist gender ideals
in this exhortation. But here, as earlier, I would propose that the
importance of this dimension be amplified. It is not too much of
a simplification to say that the three pillars of currently hegemonic
geopoliticsmost desperately in need of replacement are the ongoing
attempt to naturalize neoliberal capitalism, the ongoing ravages of
racism and its dispossessions, and a preferential resort to means of
violence and coercion which is closely linked with masculinist
assumptions, andwhich arguably underpins the other two in crucial
ways. Gerry Kearns has opened up an extremely promising avenue
for exploring some of the roots of these developments in the geopo-
litical discourses of an earlier age. Ongoing critical scholarship will
undoubtedly continue to refine our sense of how best to think about
these tenacious patterns in order to overcome them.
Situating progressive geopolitics: culture, politics and
language
Joanne Sharp
This is an important book that challenges the inevitability in
conventional historical accounts of the development of dominant
ideas – here Mackinder’s geopolitics – by juxtaposing these ideas
with those of contemporaries whose understandings of the world,
and their normative visions for how it might be better, promised
another way.
Kearns’ book develops toward his vision of Progressive Geopol-
itics, an alternative toMackinder-inspired Conservative Geopolitics.
For Kearns, Progressive Geopolitics:
[S]upplements the vision of the world that counts as reality
within Conservative Geopolitics by: adding a recognition of thescope of non-force alongside the study of the role of force in the
world; including a review of other institutions that operate
internationally beside states; [.] acknowledging that there are
more ways that goods and services are produced and supplied
than as commodities and through unregulated competition
[; . and] recognizes that the most effective ways to resolve
global issues without resorting to force often involve multilat-
eral institutions (Kearns, 2009: 266).
Thus, Kearns avoids the trap of some guises of critical geopolitics
whose restless and unending critique has led to charges of political
nihilism. Progressive Geopolitics is not afraid to say that there is
a better way of doing things and, as such, is a powerful vision
indeed.
As someone who has been associated with the emergence of
critical geopolitics, but who has become disillusioned with the
political implications of its development, I find the challenge pre-
sented by Kearns’ book important. In light of my own ambivalent
relationship with critical geopolitics, I want here to offer three
engagements with Kearns’ book: the role of geopolitics in political
culture; the political meta-values of Progressive Geopolitics; and,
finally, the implications for how we do our critical geopolitics.
To begin with geopolitical culture: one of the most important
aspects of the arguments in Geopolitics and Empire is Kearns’ devel-
opment ofMackinder as an imperial subject. This is a key, but under-
developed, area for study, as it unpacks howglobal-scale geopolitical
ideas relate to the constitution of individual identity, and thus how
individuals understand their role as citizens within the nation-state,
and the role of the country within international society. It explores,
in other words, how individuals are interpolated to become subjects
of dominant political discourse and, in the case of Mackinder, go on
to replicate this discourse through political praxis.
In Geopolitics and Empirewemove from discussion of the end of
the 19th and first part of the 20th centuries to the present with
much less emphasis paid to the Cold War. But I would argue
that the reason that post-Cold War leaders could still draw upon
geopolitical language – that they could still draw upon the Conser-
vative Geopolitical discourses of inevitability of force and conflict –
was because of the embedding within American political culture of
ColdWar geopolitical ideas (see Sharp, 2000 for an example of this).
While the language of geopolitics puts a great deal of emphasis on
force, the cultural hegemony of the geopolitical imagination is no
less powerful.
Historicizing geopolitics through the Cold War period is impor-
tant because this again counters the inevitability of geopolitical logic.
Geopolitical languagewas produced and reproduced during the Cold
War and then lingered on in the aftermath because new forms of
explanation had yet to emerge (see Agnew & Corbridge, 1995).
Although this view is still found in all sorts of powerful institu-
tions and individuals, it is in no way unchallenged, as evidenced by
the huge anti-war marches of 2003, extensive critiques of Bush and
Blair, and the fact that nearly one in four UK citizens recently indi-
cated they wanted Blair tried as a war criminal (Norton-Taylor,
2010). The zero-sum geopolitical map of power-politics does not
have the same overwhelming influence in Anglo-American political
culture as it did during the Cold War. And, if we look at the geopo-
litical imaginations of non-Anglo-American societies, it becomes
clearer still that other visions are not only possible, but are being
asserted and enacted around the world (for example, see the
work of geographers (amongst others: Featherstone, 2008; Fluri,
2009; Oslender, 2007; Routledge & Cumbers, 2009), the writings
of Arundhati Roy (e.g. 2002), or Riverbend’s blogs from Iraq).
Turning now to the meta-values of Progressive Geopolitics, I
would question whether Progressive Geopolitics is possible or, to
be devil’s advocate, whether it is even desirable. In other words,
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states and international actors? As noted earlier, Progressive
Geopolitics aims to supplement the vision of Conservative Geopoli-
tics, but will this reformist position get us where wewant to be? As
noted at the outset, this tension betweenwanting to make directed
political interventions and the imperative to critique is not unique
to Geopolitics and Empire.
What are the political values which underwrite Progressive
Geopolitics? They are not spelt out and the interlocutors that
Kearns provides to challenge the inevitability of Mackinder’s
vision – Kropótkin, Reclus, Hobson and Kingsley – do not make
easy bedfellows. Instead, I think that Geopolitics and Empire
assumes that we all know where we want to go. It is a modernist,
Enlightenment project based around progress and justice in the
political and economic realms. On the face of it, that’s uncontrover-
sial. But, whose values are these?
And this is where, despite on one level not being able to disagree
with any of the laudable ambitions of Progressive Geopolitics, I do start
to get anxious. For, if feminist and postcolonial theory has taught me
anything, it is to be wary of any prescriptions of how “we” should
progress – history is litteredwith the victims of such good intentions.
So, here is where I do want to return to a more radical and restless
critique characteristic of feminist versions of critical geopolitics,
which insists upon the multiplicity of possible futures.
Kearns claims that Progressive Geopolitics is informed by
perspectives, which include “those excluded from the privileges
of power” (p. 266). But I do not see the mechanisms for how these
different voices get heard. If Progressive Geopolitics supplements
rather than deconstructs Conservative Geopolitics, then is there the
danger of simply co-opting these other voices and experiences
rather than being radically open to views which might offer more
thorough challenge? What about those whose experiences of inter-
national organizations have been of exclusion orwhohave only been
allowed around the table when they translate themselves into
metropolitan language and convention (see Briggs & Sharp, 2004)?
In readingGeopolitics and Empire I still get the feeling that Kearns,
likeMackinder, sees geography as an aid to statecraft, but as an aid to
a progressive state;whereMackindermight have sought to aid Bush,
perhaps Kearns’ vision is one better suited to Obama.
Finally, taking up the question of how we actually do our geopo-
litical analysis, I note that we have, as critical geographers, tended to
be rather self-effacing when it comes to embracing our roles as
public intellectuals, but perhaps it is time to think muchmore about
using our authority, rather than anxiously denying it. But, we need to
think carefully about howwewrite. To use one of Kearns’ alternative
voices as an example, Mary Kingsley was able to write only by
including self-effacing comments to ensure she was not seen as
too competent or too much of a challenge to masculinist authority.
Humor like hers can be a powerful political force, but it is easily
misread. What to 21st century feminists is a powerful ironic narra-
tive, in other contexts, reinforces a sense of silly headed femininity.
Conservative Geopolitics uses a language of reason, objectivity
and inevitability. At its heart is “common sense”. Geopolitical
experts reduce complex arguments to the simplicity of right and
wrong, and true and false. This form of knowledge production is
very different from critical social science, which seeks always to
open up the apparently self-evident to examination, and to expose
the omissions and assumptions that allow common sense to func-
tion. Critical texts are never closed or complete like common sense.
So, we face a challenge not only in offering different explanations of
theworld, but the very language that we use. How canwe engender
a desire in people to want to tackle the difficult, complex and open
nature of critical analysis rather than the cut and dried presenta-
tions of common sense, which does all the work for its audience?
Kearns has been exemplary in this respect, communicating hisProgressive Geopolitics in a much wider realm of publics than is
typical of critical geopolitics, with sites ranging from BBC’s Radio
4 to the magazine Wired.Mackinder’s legacy!
Peter J. Hugill
In his preface to this landmark book Kearns sets out both
his crucial intellectual contribution and the crucial intellectual
tensions it embodies. He does so via Christopher GoGwilt’s work
on Joseph Conrad, which operates at the intersection of literature,
culture, and the intellectual and geopolitical histories of the turn
of the 1900s. For GoGwilt, “Conrad’s work reveals a double-
mapping, whereby a newly European idea of the Westdborrowed
from the terms of Russian debatesddistorts theworldwide shatter-
ing of cultural traditions at the turn of the century by an attempt to
reconstitute historical discontinuity as the continuity of ‘Western
history’” (GoGwilt, 1995, 3). This is Kearns’ first tension. The second
is that whereas Conrad’s earlier work, typified by Heart of Darkness
(1899), focused on the “new imperialism” of the late 1800s, his later
work, such as The Secret Agent (1907), shifted focus to the revolu-
tionary responses to that new imperialism.
Mackinder was one of several possible intellectual and cultural
products of his time and place, in which, GoGwilt argues, many had
ceased to believe, as they had earlier, that Enlightenment values
would diffuse from Europe to the rest of the world, and that Europe
was an integral part, albeit the leading edge, of a universal history
of humankind (GoGwilt, 2000). By the late 1800s, however, that
belief was increasingly challenged by anti-colonial movements and
insurgent nationalisms. Rising European imperialism and GoGwilt’s
“fiction of ‘geopolitics’,” locates the geopolitics espoused by Mack-
inder as representing the increasing identification of Europeans
with avery different viewof theWest.Mackinder’s geopolitics argued
for a European exceptionalism in which the unique history of the
West was threatened by the geopolitical “other,” notably an East “in
opposition” to the West in the manner identified by Edward Said as
Orientalism (1979). As Kearns notes, Mackinder believed that, ulti-
mately, only force could maintain Europe’s privileged position both
against indigenous peoples and, since theworld had “closed” in terms
of geographic expansion, against other European empires competing
for resources inwhat Mackinder saw as a Darwinian zero-sum game.
In following GoGwilt’s line of reasoning Kearns modifies and
expands on Agnew’s discussion of Civilizational and Naturalized
Geopolitics. The main elements of the Civilizational Geopolitics of
the early 1800s were “A commitment to European uniqueness as
a civilization; a belief that the roots of European distinctiveness
were found in its past; [and] a sense that though other cultures
might have noble pasts with high achievements, they had been
eclipsed” (Agnew, 2003: 87). The Naturalized Geopolitics of the
late 1800s saw “a world divided into imperial and colonized
peoples, states with ‘biological needs’ for territory/resources and
outlets for enterprise, [and] a ‘closed’ world in which one state’s
political-economic success was at another’s expense” (Agnew,
2003: 94). Agnew sees the shift from Civilizational to Naturalized
Geopolitics as occurring around 1875, driven largely by internal
European forces. For Agnew, Mackinder was reacting against the
collapse of the European Concert that created at the Congress of
Vienna, the rise of competing European Empires, especially newly
unified Germany, and the consequent loss of British hegemony.
There is much to this, but Kearns’ argument is more existential
and convincing than Agnew’s. Mackinder was driven not only by
fear of a British loss of hegemony but also by a much deeper-seated
(and unstated) fear of a European loss.
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to this existential fear. Socialists, anarchists, and feminists such as
Hobson, Reclus, Kropótkin, and Kingsley clearly espoused far
more culturally inclusive views of humankind, and not just as indi-
vidual scholars sympathetic to the world outside Europe: all were
connected to institutional movements within Europe that argued
against the sort of solutions based on force inherent to colonial
imperialism. At their extremes such alternatives to imperialism
were revolutionary, as Conrad understood at the time.
The point of this tension is well taken, but the book fails to
answer several questions. First, is imperialism (at least in the
modern world) only and always a response to anti-colonial move-
ments and insurgent nationalisms, or is it more complex? Is, for
example, Colonial Imperialism of the sort espoused by Mackinder
just such a response? In Kearns’ presentation, Liberal Imperialism
seems an attempt to hold on to the Enlightenment belief that
such core, liberal, European values as openness to foreign direct
investment, lack of aggressive impulse toward other states, and
democracy could continue to diffuse, albeit under more control
from the parent country (Kearns, 2009: 233).
Second, should one view Reclus, Hobson, Kingsley, and
Kropótkin as clinging to Enlightenment values, or their vision as
something new? Such revolutionary forces as socialism, feminism,
and anarchism began to move to the forefront of western social
thought just as confidence in the liberal ideals that drove the earlier
1800sdAgnew’s Civilizational and Kearns’ Liberal Geopoli-
ticsdwas declining. Socialism, feminism, and anarchism seem
like updated, modernized versions of an Enlightenment conviction
that European ideas were naturally superior. Kingsley’s feminism
may bewilling to celebrate cultural diversity, but hardly at the price
of accepting, for example, the clearly discriminatory practices of
Islam toward women.
A third question arises from the fact that, for Mackinder, a major
justification for colonial imperialism was the Social Darwinism of
the late 1800s. Mackinder saw international relations as shaped
by history, environment, and race (and race was itself shaped by
environment working over historical timednot in the crude
way suggested by Ellsworth Huntington, but very much a force
subject to cultural control). Underpinning this Darwinism was
a force Kearns does not address but Mackinder must have been
aware of, the Malthusian trap that seemed to be staring the world
in the face as world population outpaced agricultural output. By
the late 1800s, the British were well aware they were importing
massive amounts of both foods and agricultural raw materials,
especially cotton. Much of this was sourced in the Empire. To
a contemporary Briton Colonial Imperialism would have seemed
a necessity. Hobson summed up exactly that view when he noted
that many of his contemporaries believed that “an ever larger share
of our population.is.dependent for life and work upon food and
raw materials from foreign lands” (Hobson, 1938 [1902]: 71–72).
Other solutions to the food and raw material supply problems
than colonial imperialismwere suggested at the time.Hobson argued
that British imperialists were “like the slovenly farmer.ignoring the
political and economic wastes and risks involved by this imperial
career” and that they should “put brains into agriculture” like
Denmark or Switzerland (Hobson, 1938 [1902]: 92–93). More often,
however, solutions were embedded in the new, Racialized Geopoli-
tics rather than the simple economics that drove much of Liberal
and even Colonial Imperialism. In Mutual Aid (1902) Kropótkin
suggested that evolutionary selection operated through the struggles
of entire species against their environment, that cooperation was
an evolutionary advantage, and that adaptive mutations were
Lamarckian in rate, not Darwinian (Kearns, 2009: 69). For Kropótkin,
geographic expansion, thus imperialism, was completely unneces-
sary. He argued that, when the revolutionary social principles ofAnarchist Communism were combined with scientific agriculture,
“the 3½ million inhabitants of the two departments round Paris
could find ample bread by cultivating only a third of their territory”
(Kropótkin, 1968 [1913]: 278).
Kropótkin’s problemwas his insistence that evolution was based
on the fitness of the group. This arguably leads to espousing another
set of revolutionary ideals: which groups are fittest to inhabit the
earth andwho should have the right tomembership in such groups?
The combination of such racial theories with a perceived need to
increase the supply of food and raw materials led Hitler to argue
for a policy of geographic expansionism that, at the height of Racial-
ized Geopolitics, went far beyond Colonial Imperialism: that “soil
exists for the people which possesses the force to take it and the
industry to cultivate it” (Hitler, 1971 [1925]: 134). Ultimately, of
course, a very different set of revolutionary Germans solved the
immediate problem of the Malthusian trap and ensured the world-
supply of food and agricultural raw materials kept pace with popu-
lation via the rapid development from the late 1800s on of an organic
chemistry that delivered not only nitrogenous fertilizers but also,
ultimately, synthetic fibers such as polyester (Hugill & Bachman,
2005; Smil, 2001). Science and technology thus made geographic
expansion, colonies, and territorial forms of imperialism unneces-
sary, as some recognized in the 1930s (Hugill, 1993; Zischka, 1936).
In his last two chapters Kearns provides a thorough analysis of
the Conservative Geopolitics propounded byMackinder and picked
up by the Neoconservatives in the United States, especially during
the administration of President George W. Bush. Clearly, Conserva-
tive Geopolitics in both late 1800s Britain and late 1900s America
was a response to existential fears of decline and the non-western
other. But what, then, is Progressive Geopolitics? Transnational
corporations (TNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
may be becoming important relative to territorialized polities, but
TNCs are not new, as the East India Companies of the Seventeenth
Century attest. Organizations like the United Nations are clearly
a continuation of the Enlightenment project, one prefigured by
numerous calls for some form of global NGO that date to the early
1900s, such as King Camp Gillette’s World Corporation (1910) on
the right and the International Workers of the World on the left
(Hugill, 1993).
It is clear that the recent attempt by Neoconservatives in the
United States to revive a Conservative Geopolitics of the sort Mack-
inder would recognize has failed, at least for the moment. The revo-
lutionary alternatives of Anarchism, Communism, Fascism, and
Socialism have also failed, and Feminism, though clearly successful
in theWest, has never seemed a particularly compellingworldview.
But is Progressive Geopolitics of the sort Kearns espouses a radical
improvement? It seems at first sight rather like old wine in a new
bottle, the Enlightenment project revved up for the twenty-first
century, effectively a revised version of Liberal Imperialism with
more legal protection for the rights of indigenous peoples. Inas-
much as “global political relations can only be understood as part
of a global political economy” (Kearns, 2009: 295) it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the world needs a hegemonic power.
Since hegemonic powers tend to some form of imperialism, even
if only cultural imperialism, a liberal version of that will be a great
deal better than a conservative one.What would Mackinder think of the state of geography today?
Lorraine Dowler
As I started to write this essay I realized that it was going to be
a far greater challenge than I realized. As I read Kearns book, I
appreciated how little I really knew about the life of Halford
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current state of discipline and question what Halford Mackinder
would think of it today. Therefore this essay offers a set of reflec-
tions rather than a scholarly intervention. As I read I wondered if
Mackinder would have been saddened to know that when I
haphazardly quizzed graduate students around the department
about “Who was Halford Mackinder?” most of them, like myself,
had only a vague idea? Perhaps he would have been more dis-
tressed of knowing that a female geographer had posed this ques-
tion and that the field-of-study he had appreciated as a “manly
endeavor” was evolving.
I appreciate how Kearns also attempted to bring Mackinder’s
thinking into the 21st century by drawing parallels between Colo-
nial conquest and U.S. imperialist actions in the War on Terror. For
this reason, I would recommend Kearns’ examination of Mackinder
as a “must read” for every graduate student entering the discipline;
not simply for his critical analysis of geography’s imperial past but
for his ability to point to discursive parallels of imperialism with
contemporary modes of conquest. I say this for several reasons.
First, his thesis provides evidence of the seamless relationship
between geopolitics and British Imperialism, Nazi expansion, the
Cold War and the contemporary War on Terror. Second, for a disci-
pline that at times has difficulty in making connections across its
sub-fields of study, Kearns’ discussion of Mackinder’s training as
a physical and human geographer (p. 42) implicates the discipline,
en masse, in the quest for territorial expansion. As Kearns argues,
the “treatment of evolution within the humanities, that Mackinder
found at Oxford, was broadly Social Darwinist and it reinforced the
assumptions of racial inequality upon which rested the Empire”
(p. 42) and thus Kearns demonstrates the interdependent nature
of education, humanities and science on one hand with the process
of militarization on the other (p. 3). Lastly, although not specifically
identified by Kearns, his discussion of a progressive geopolitics trig-
gers, at least for this reader, some thought-provoking questions
about the current state of the discipline and its relationship to
issues of political practice.
As I read through Geopolitics and Empire, I identified some paral-
lels between Kearns’ reading of Mackinder and some feminist
assessments of contemporary modes of militarization. It is impor-
tant to note that I am not offering this discussion of Kearns’ thesis
as a critique of any absence in his work. Instead, I contend Kearns
investigation initiated some insights that, as a feminist geographer,
assist me in how I think of my own work and how I view some
contemporary trends within the discipline of geography. Conse-
quently this essay will engage two themes. First, I will explore
some of the ways in which Kearns and feminist analysis of geopol-
itics parallel and push each other to provide an enhanced under-
standing of geopolitics, militarization and empire building; and
second I will suggest some ways the discipline might be sustaining
these processes today.
As suggested, I begin with the parallels between feminist
scholars’ concerns with militarization and Kearns’ argument that,
during the period of imperialism, geopolitics viewed force as more
than simply necessary but inevitable! Kearns skillfully illustrates
British Imperialism as a “manly endeavor” and details how Mack-
inder argued against the admittance of women to the Royal
Geographical Society due to “women’s lack of robustness for scien-
tific exploration” (p. 100). Kearns asserts that gender most certainly
shaped the political imagination of the period. Furthermore, he
details Mackinder’s attitude that the role of British women in the
colonies was “great imperial work” and that womenwere necessary
to maintain the domestic realm to free men to pursue the spoils of
imperialism, unregulated by feminism.
As part of his analysis Kearns examines the famous African
mountain climbs of Mackinder and Kingsley and evaluates howvery similar feats were presented in gendered ways. Kingsley, as
Kearns argues, pushed through the climb by reflecting on the
memory of her dead father while on the other hand Mackinder
was on a manly adventure, doing what men were suppose to be
doing, conquering the natural environment, as menwould conquer
the supposed wilds of Africa. Feminist scholars have noted that
historically during times of heightened nationalism, women who
have crossed into the public sphere in transgressive ways, like
Kingsley were usually explained away, as being driven by the
ghosts of dead fathers, husbands and sons (Ward, 1995).
As Kearns argues, “there are striking parallels between the
geopolitical ideas animating those who advocate the consolidation
or even extension of the global influence of the United States today,
and those who a century ago took up a similar stance on behalf of
Great Britain.” (p. 3). Although Kearns does an excellent job of
detailing how masculinity aided in the establishment of the global
influence of Great Britain, he does not carry this analysis over to the
discursive ties he suggests with the War on Terror. For example,
Mackinder’s thesis of the natural vigor of manly men for great
adventure is rearticulated today in the United States military poli-
cies on exclusion. Illustrative of this would be the current “don’t
ask, don’t tell” restrictions on gays in the military and the limita-
tions placed on women to non-combat roles. These policies can
be viewed as a rearticulation of the political imagination of
conquest. For instance, though women are designated to “support”
roles in the military they are indeed dying as a result of their close
proximity to the frontline. As a nation we find comfort when
women are assigned to support roles (helpmates) even if they
happen to die as a result of those roles. Under “don’t ask don’t
tell” and combat exclusions laws, the notion of the heterosexual
male warrior remains unscathed. These gender tropes are integral
to the American imperialism and expansion that Kearns so vehe-
mently critiques.
As well, Kearns contends that Mackinder was constant in his
belief that women should not be admitted to the Royal Geographic
Society. Mackinder also wanted to restrict women in wider society
and was against women acquiring the right to vote. Today, we can
see similar issues with the gendering of wider society, as it relates
to the process of militarization, in that the militarization of society
is not simply questioning the roles of women in the armed forces
but the societal attitudes toward the establishment of gender roles
withinwider civil society (Dowler, 2002; Enloe, 2007). For example,
if women were equally participating in contemporary foreign
policy of conquest and expansion then what would happen to the
political imagery of protection of the domestic sphere or the home?
Consequently, I propose as a discipline we question how notions
of contemporary geographic expansion are framed as the protec-
tion of the domestic. As Cowen and Gilbert suggest, the concept
of the homeland has been reinforced since 9/11 and that metaphors
constituted from notions of family have been invoked to promote
national security initiatives across scale. They examine how
a “normative nuclear family” has become a central focus of U.S.
political imagination. As result the understanding of the heteronor-
mative nuclear family has been evoked to mobilize a domestic
response. For this reason, they assert the loss of the traditional
family and the loss of the nation have been conflated producing
a vision of the neoliberal family as (the only) good citizens. For
Cowen and Gilbert, the family metaphor is skillfully manipulated
by the state to create a fear of a culture of dependency (Cowen
and Gilbert, 2008). Representations of the independent neoliberal
family become a central strategy whereby the lack of a strong
family structure would weaken the nation to our enemies. There-
fore, I see an argument for a case of historical repetition in terms
of how Mackinder was employing gender in relation to statecraft
and how it is currently being employed during the War on Terror.
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a discipline, to be aware of howwemay continue to be aiding state-
craft and empire building. As stated earlier, Kearns argues that
Mackinder was steadfastly against women entering the Royal
Geographic Society because it would feminize, hence weaken, the
organization. But, hasn’t parts of contemporary human geography
been feminized, such as political, cultural and historical geography,
in favor of the manly endeavors of geopolitical analysis. The femi-
nist critique of geopolitics is relatively nascent and has had a slower
level of integration than compared with other subareas such as
cultural and urban geography (Dowler & Sharp, 2001). Not surpris-
ingly, at the annual meeting of geographers in Washington D.C.,
many feminist scholars noticed the absence of feminist analysis
in sessions focused on the New War, while sessions focused on
the everyday manifestations of militarization were overwhelm-
ingly attended by feminist scholars. This prompted a discussion
in the final militarization session about why there seems to be
a rift between geopolitical inquiry and feminist political interven-
tions. As part of this discussion there was a general belief that it
was still difficult to publish feminist work in the flagship political
geography journal. To this end, one can only surmise that even
today, the area of geopolitical inquiry remains somewhat mascu-
linist and therefore constitutes a frontline of intervention for femi-
nist scholars.
Finally, the last critical question Geopolitics and Empire raised
for me is: How are we teaching against empire in our classrooms?
Kearns argues, “Geographical education would train young people
in the strategic gaze of the fox-hunter and the solider and, ulti-
mately, they would, through Mackinder’s school-books learn to
encompass the world with this geographical imagination and
thereby develop an imperial vision” (p. 164). Geography as a disci-
pline finds itself at a crossroads of teaching a progressive geopol-
itics, to unearth contemporary acts of imperialism, racism, sexism
and homophobia. While still aiding the state through certain
types of educational programs, such as geospatial intelligence
education.
In the beginning of this essay I asked: “What would Mackinder
think of the state of the discipline today?” I would dare to speculate
that he would have mixed feelings. He would most likely be reas-
sured to know that the area of geopolitical inquiry still remains
a manly endeavor (Laliberte, Driscoll Derikson, & Dowler, 2010).
However, I would surmise that he would be greatly disheartened
by the important research being conducted in the area of critical
geography, focusing on destabilizing issues of militarization, which
aid in the establishment of sexist, racist and homophobic discourses.
I would include Kearns’ insights into Mackinder as an important
addition to this critical body of work.Progressive historiography
Gerry Kearns
Hannah, Sharp, Hugill, and Dowler pay me the compliment of
identifying important issues with which my book engages and
each also reminds me of work of their own that takes up these
matters in ways that either complement or challenge my own
emphases. I am grateful for the opportunity to elaborate on some
of the methodological choices that I left implicit within the book
itself.
I adopt what Berdoulay calls a contextual approach and try to
produce what Dean refers to as critical and effective histories
(Berdoulay, 1981; Dean, 1994; Kearns, 2007, 2008). A contextual
history of Geography is one that relates geographical ideas to the
political, moral, economic, and other circumstances that explainthe demand for certain perspectives, why they achieve salience in
particular periods. By a critical history of Geography I mean one
that stresses the contingency of events and developments to
make evident the political and ethical choices that directed the
development of the discipline in different times and places. By an
effective history of Geography I mean one that relates this contin-
gency to the unrealized potential of the present (Kearns, 1998).
Alternative geographical perspectives were and remain possible
and past alternatives can provide a resource for thinking about
alternatives in the present. Past institutions, networks, and spatial-
ities share many features with the present and continuities
between past and present significantly shape geographical imagi-
nations. Specifically in Geopolitics, the field of geographical
reasoning that my book addresses, there have been over the past
century or so continuities in global relations which have meant
that influential commentators often refer to the works of earlier
thinkers in support of their own arguments. In this manner we
may speak of the influence of earlier theory on later ideas but
earlier thinkers may also be unconsciously echoed in later writings.
Common goals often result in similar justifications being produced
in different contexts as advocates for a given strategy try to present
it as so overwhelmingly the correct choice that it can appear to be
an inevitable choice (Kearns, in press). Thus, in naturalizing impe-
rialism thinkers in very different contexts develop arguments
that echo loudly those of Mackinder because he set out one of
the strongest cases for imperialism as the necessary route to
national survival and others wishing to argue the same will hit
upon many of the same points.
I take the thought and legacy of Mackinder as the occasion for
my contextual, critical, and effective history of Geopolitics. To begin
with, I establish the political, social, and economic context of Mack-
inder’s work through an examination of the perceived and real
crisis of the British Empire in the period 1880–1920 and the ways
that Mackinder registered this crisis and took up educational and
political work to address it. Secondly, I try to make this a critical
history by identifying a series of thinkers who, although they
shared many of the intellectual assumptions of Mackinder and
although they likewise saw imperialism as crucial in shaping global
relations between peoples, did not share Mackinder’s vision of the
inevitability of conflict and exploitation. Finally, I try to make my
history effective by tracing the legacy of Mackinder through to
the present and by identifying two sets of polarities that do not
necessarily map onto one another (as inferred by Hugill). The first
polarity is between Colonial Imperialism and Liberal Imperialism.
I identify imperialism in processes abridging the sovereignty of
people in one place for the benefit of people in another place and
I distinguish between colonial and liberal variants on the basis of
the justifications that are offered in their support, with colonial
imperialists frankly avowing their own self interest in exploiting
others and liberal imperialists insisting that their interference in
the affairs of others is in service of the best interests of those others.
The second polarity is between a Conservative Geopolitics that
builds upon Mackinder’s insights and a Progressive Geopolitics
that might develop those of the alternative thinkers I discuss.
What is conservative about the first of these approaches is that it
serves explicitly and implicitly to promote global inequalities
that maintain contemporary privileges of thewealthy and powerful
whereas the latter seeks to address these inequities and make
a case for mitigating them. I will now take these three aspects of
my approach (context, critique, and effectiveness) to address the
remarks of the commentators.
I begin with context and here I note that Hugill specifies the
crisis of Mackinder’s world in a rather different way than I or Mack-
inder did. Hugill suggests that the crisis of Empire was really
a symptom of a broader Malthusian trap inwhich world population
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resolved ultimately by technology. On Hugill’s reading, imperi-
alism, then, can be seen as a conflict over the size of the slice
each state gets whereas the true resolution of the crisis lay with
the scientific cooks who baked a bigger pie altogether. In fact, I
insist upon the fundamentally imperialist character of the crisis
precisely because the balance between needs and resources is
always a matter of distribution. There has never been a global
balance struck and the imperialist character of Mackinder’s thought
is explicit in theways he sought to privilege the needs and comforts
of the British people. For Mackinder, the crucial questions were:
which people lived well, where resided the shareholders of the
companies that made profits from international trade, and whose
will prevailed in struggles over access to resources and the control
of trade? These questions of distribution continue to shape life
chances in different parts of the world regardless of the global
adequacy of food, materials, or energy.
Turning from a contextual to a critical reading of the past, Hugill,
Hannah, and Sharp each raise questions about the limits of the
alternative available from theworks of Mary Kingsley, John Hobson,
Peter Kropótkin, and Élisée Reclus. Hugill makes the point that
although Liberal Imperialism may be different from Colonial Impe-
rialism they are both imperialistic, but in arguing for a Progressive
Geopolitics I am not arguing for Liberal Imperialism. For me, the
historical thinkers I mentioned, as well as others, offer resources
for a Progressive Geopolitics precisely because of their criticisms
of various aspects of the imperialism of their own day. Beyond
this I register explicitly my own concern over the ways some of
them sought to justify on occasion certain other aspects of contem-
porary imperialism, in colonial (Reclus) or liberal (Hobson, Kings-
ley) forms. However, I cannot follow Hugill in equating Kropótkin
with Hitler, because Kropótkin focused upon the struggle between
a group and its environment, a struggle that could be managed
successfully on the basis of cooperation and that, therefore, explic-
itly did not entail aggressive competition with other groups in
neighboring or distant places. In emphasizing their critical relations
with the theme of imperialism, I did not take up the alternative,
valuable and interesting matter of the overall bearing of their ideas
upon the issues of liberalism and the so-called Enlightenment
project more generally.
Hugill notes that in various ways the thinkers I discuss as alter-
natives to Mackinder had links to institutions and movements that
sustained opposition to certain aspects of violent colonial imperi-
alism although this is certainly underdeveloped in the book.
Hannah is right that such a discussion would help flesh out the
nature and limits of the alternative contingently available at the
time Mackinder wrote. Hannah suggests that one way to do so is
to pay attention to the different forms of masculinity beyond the
moment of exploration that I highlighted, to comprise rational
bureaucracy and the gentleman’s club and I would add two distinc-
tive spheres of masculine endeavor that I did sketch briefly, parlia-
ment and the university. Hannah proposes that within all these
spheres a pervasive masculinity probably rendered alternatives to
imperialism little more than intellectual exercises. Sharp identifies
a further lacuna when she insists upon the need to move beyond
academic texts to the popular media outlets that enable a geopolit-
ical culture to become part of a society’s common-sense view of the
world. Taken together these remarks highlight the need to saymore
about how some ideas become dominant and influence foreign
policy while others are marginalized.
In my book I specified some of the personal and political
networks that Mackinder cultivated and that were part of his effec-
tiveness. For example, I described his work within education
precisely as a way of making an imperial worldview part of the
common sense of every British child. In terms of the results of allthis activity, I described the ways that Mackinder contributed to
the successful case for an arms race in the years leading up to the
First World War but I also registered some of the limits of Mack-
inder’s influence over the anti-Bolshevik policy of the coalition
government that followed the First WorldWar. It would be possible
to say more, of course; to look at the various schemes to promote
emigration by British people to other parts of the Empire, to
consider the relative ease with which young people of all classes
were summoned to arms with the declaration of war in 1914, and
to look, for example, at Mackinder’s own efforts as a military
recruiter during the First World War. Turning to the alternatives
to imperialism, I did try to show how the anti-racist humanism of
Roger Casement, as well as of Hobson, Kingsley, Reclus and Kropót-
kin, built upon the ideology and the practice of the anti-slavery
movement and I do think more broadly that alternatives to imperi-
alism could be imagined largely because anti-colonial practice in
Ireland, India, and Egypt, for example, and anti-racist sentiment
as developed within certain strands of evangelical Christianity
and through the example of African–American writers and artists,
had already made it possible to conceive a fellowship of humanity
that transcended race. The war-weariness that followed the First
World War was certainly fed by these oppositional movements
and it placed serious limits upon the imperial adventuring of the
British government in subsequent years. The links that Hannah
identifies between masculinity on one hand and the related strate-
gies of violence and control on the other are close and their joint
operation is indeed powerful but while hegemonic in many rich
countries this nexus is subject to occasional check.
When we turn from critique to effectiveness, the responses
suggest I should perhaps say a little more about my decision to
focus upon imperialism rather than upon the nature of the West,
or upon the forms of liberalism, or upon the Enlightenment project
tout court. With Sharp I register a certain dissatisfaction with
Critical Geopolitics but my own unease is that the focus upon epis-
temological questions (undermining once again any claims to
a singular truth about the global order) still leaves us in need of crit-
ical accounts of international relations. Here I suggest that one way
to address the tendency of Conservative Geopolitics to make global
inequalities appear “natural” is to pay some attention to ontological
rather than epistemological matters. The naturalizing of capitalism,
imperialism, and racism operates precisely by closing down our
imaginations, causing us to accept a very particular and limited
account of reality. In this fashion, Mackinder chose to distinguish
between ‘democratic ideals and reality’ (Mackinder, 1919). In sum,
conservative politics insists that there is no alternative to these
iniquitous arrangements. In response I offer my account of Progres-
sive Geopolitics as a supplement to Conservative Geopolitics. I am
saying that, yes, the phenomena to which conservatives attend
(force, conflict, etc.) are indeed part of the global relations that
shape our lives but they are not the only phenomena which should
command our scholarly and political interest. Thus the conservative
posture of dismissing social justice, non-commodity economic
relations, international law, and human rights as merely idealistic
is blinkered and misleading. In other words, there continues to be
a material basis for the alternative perspectives that may be devel-
oped further from the ideas of Hobson, Kingsley, Kropótkin, and
Reclus.
My focus upon imperialism also inflects where I direct Progres-
sive Geopolitics. Sharp worries that I am saying that I know where
we need to be going and that I am seeking to impose an Enlighten-
ment project upon others. I am more narrowly interrogating the
ways that rich and powerful countries compromise the sovereignty
of other states and peoples. It is on the basis of our interactionswith
others that I think we acquire obligations toward them and these
obligations relate both to the nature of our interactions and to
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Because the rich countries compromise the sovereignty and
abridge the life chances of people who live elsewhere, the citizens
of rich countries have an obligation to offer recompense to those
they have harmed and an imperative duty to desist from doing
this harm when they learn of it. I wish to see the rich countries
govern their own behavior consistently with the values they claim
as their own: tolerance, respect for the sovereignty of others, atten-
tion to the needs of the least fortunate. I believe that rich countries
have the right to offer asylum to people perceived as being treated
badly under their current government. Beyond this, and short of
direct action to halt crimes against humanity, powerful countries
have few grounds for intervention and certainly should not
presume to impose democracy or capitalism at the barrel of
a gun. In particular, I believe that other people should leave well
alone the land, resources, and lives of the world’s first-nations or
indigenous peoples. I am certainly not advocating any form of
imperialism which was, indeed, the intended focus of my critique.
This brings me back to Geography and Dowler’s excellent
suggestion that scholars and educators consider the continued
entwining of Geography, masculinity, and imperialism in their
work. I do make a few remarks on this in the book and I continue
to reflect upon these issues (Kearns, 2010). With one eye upon
howmy book might be used in the classroom, I made the conscious
choice not to spell out the methodological context and choices
because I wanted the book to raise issues rather than be read as
an example of a particular approach. Geographers can certainly
have a useful discussionwith their students about the epistemolog-
ical arrogance of Western Enlightenment and its claims about
singular truth. However, geographers can also talk about what
sort of home we want to make of the Earth and the ways that
geographical studies direct our attention to the forces and capac-
ities that might help or hinder making such a home (Anon, 2010;
Kearns, 2009).
Dowler and Hannah are correct to point to the separations and
hierarchies that masculinist rhetoric polices within Geography. It
is almost trite to remind students and colleagues that every time
commentators contrast hard and soft science, they make precisely
this sort of separation and privileging. The work that is needed to
understand the ways that what Dowler terms the ‘everyday mani-
festations of militarization’ are related to ‘geopolitical inquiry’ is
challenging and will build upon such exemplary studies as Puar’s
analysis of ‘South Park and the Pakistani Leather Bottom’ (Puar,
2007: 67–76). Puar’s work challenges the reality of the separation
between spheres and articulates a queer ethic that can cultivate
resistance to the blandishments of male heterosexual privilege.
Dowler suggests that one of the important ways the separate
spheres are articulated is through the presentation of war as the
protection of the domestic. With a Defense Department that
organizes war this may seem self-evident but, again, it is very
challenging to understand the instability of the separation between
the domestic and the foreign and the chauvinistic injustice of
privileging the first over the second. From immigration to public
health to economic stability, the task of critical human geography
is in part to show that borders are so porous that managing vulner-
ability can never be about relying upon fences. The very separation
that allowed the identification of a discrete field of Geopolitics is
thoroughly problematic. As Dowler suggests, part of the way that
Geopolitics serves imperialism is by naturalizing these separations
and hierarchies.References
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